This is an analysis piece. It reflects the views of the author.
Flock Safety founder and CEO Garrett Langley has been consistent and direct about his company’s goal. “Our mission is to eliminate crime. Full stop,” he wrote in a company blog post.
In a 2025 Forbes interview, he put it even more plainly. “I think we can have a crime-free city and civil liberties… We can have it all,” he said.
It’s worth taking that mission seriously. Clay County has spent close to $1.76 million taking him up on it. And it’s worth asking a harder question than whether the technology works.
What happens when a government, any government, adopts “eliminate crime, full stop” as an organizing goal? What happens when it builds the total-information infrastructure it believes that goal requires?
To be clear about what this piece is arguing, and what it isn’t: this is not a claim that Garrett Langley is an authoritarian, or that Flock Safety is secretly building a police state. At least not on purpose.
It’s a narrower and, I think, more useful claim. The specific logic Langley is using, that enough surveillance, enough data, and enough integration can drive crime to zero, is not a new idea.
Regimes with far less benign intentions than those of a Georgia Tech-founded public safety company have tried it before. Every one of them failed to eliminate crime.
What they built instead, in pursuit of that promise, was some of the most invasive surveillance and social control apparatuses in modern history. The tools being sold today don’t come with an ideology attached.
But once built and normalized, the same tools are available to whoever holds power next.
The Promise That’s Been Made Before
The Soviet Union built its entire theory of criminal justice on a promise to eliminate crime, not eventually reduce it, but eliminate it outright. Lenin argued in The State and Revolution that crime was a product of capitalist exploitation.
He believed that removing exploitation would cause crime to disappear entirely, and that the state itself would become unnecessary.
By the 1960s, Soviet leaders were publicly predicting a fully crime-free communist society was roughly twenty years away. It never arrived.
What arrived in the meantime was a state that used its promise of an eventual crime-free utopia to justify total control in the present.
That meant a vast informant network, arbitrary detention, and a press and academic establishment that suppressed any data suggesting the promise wasn’t being kept.
East Germany’s Stasi operated on a related but more mechanical premise. The idea was that sufficiently total surveillance could prevent virtually all crime and dissent before it happened.
Informants were embedded so densely that an estimated one in every sixty citizens was reporting to the state in some capacity.
The Stasi didn’t meaningfully distinguish between preventing crime and preventing dissent. Once the goal is “eliminate all of it,” the two categories tend to collapse into each other. Whatever threatens order gets classified as the problem to be surveilled away.
Nazi Germany’s criminal police built out a doctrine called vorbeugende Verbrechensbekämpfung, or “preventive crime fighting.” It reframed crime as something to be identified and removed before it occurred, rather than punished after the fact.
In practice, this meant “preventive detention” of people the regime classified as habitual criminals or “asocials,” often without any crime having been committed at all. The stated goal was a racially and socially “pure” community, understood as inherently crime-free once the right people had been removed from it.
Modern China offers the clearest living example of this same logic, deployed at a scale Flock’s marketing materials explicitly gesture toward. The government’s “Peaceful China” (平安中国) campaign and its “Skynet” and “Sharp Eyes” camera networks combine facial recognition, license plate tracking, and predictive policing into a single state platform.
They are marketed using nearly identical language to Flock’s own: comprehensive data, comprehensive cameras, comprehensive crime reduction.
In Xinjiang, that same infrastructure has been used to enable one of the most extensive documented surveillance regimes against an ethnic and religious minority in the modern world. It has been justified throughout as counterterrorism and crime prevention.
What These Examples Have in Common
None of these regimes actually eliminated crime. What they had in common wasn’t success. It was the use of an unfalsifiable, always-just-out-of-reach promise of a crime-free society to justify surveillance and control that expanded well past whatever the original crime-reduction rationale could support.
Once “eliminate crime” is the mission, there is no natural stopping point. No level of camera coverage, data retention, or network integration fully satisfies “full stop.” There is only ever a case for more.
Where the Comparison Breaks Down, and Where It Doesn’t
This is also where it’s important to be honest about the comparison's limits. Flock Safety is a private company selling equipment to democratically elected and appointed officials.
It operates under the Fourth Amendment, Florida’s public records law, and at least nominal judicial oversight. None of those constraints existed in the USSR, East Germany, or Nazi Germany, and they barely exist in China today.
Clay County residents can vote out a sheriff or a commissioner. Soviet citizens could not vote out the Politburo.
But this series of reporting has also documented what's already happening in Clay County alone. A 95-camera network has a year of data retention, not the advertised 30 days.
A 104-device system is built explicitly to absorb private citizens’ camera feeds into a government-searchable network under a “public/private partnership.”
The system integrates live 911 dispatch data with camera feeds in real time. A $221,300 contract is for a system explicitly marketed using the language of a “real-time crime center.”
Six-figure, multi-year commitments were signed without a public vote. None of that required an authoritarian government.
It required only a sheriff’s office, a compliant vendor, and a mission statement, “eliminate crime, full stop,” flexible enough to justify each next expansion as the logical continuation of the last.
Langley himself has faced sustained scrutiny this year following documented cases of Flock technology being misused by individual officers to stalk and surveil private citizens.
In response, he has begun calling for “compromise” between privacy and safety. That’s a notable shift from “full stop.” It suggests that even Flock’s own leadership is discovering what history already showed.
An absolute goal, pursued through total information, tends to produce outcomes its architects didn’t originally intend. By the time that becomes clear, the infrastructure is already built, funded, and hard to unwind.
That last part isn’t hypothetical for Clay County. As this outlet has reported, the county’s largest camera contract carries a five-year term with no clause allowing the county to simply change its mind and walk away.
The infrastructure, in other words, tends to outlast the debate about whether it should exist.
This is an opinion and analysis piece. Clay News & Views’ ongoing reporting on the facts of Clay County’s Flock Safety contracts can be found in our series on the contracts and equipment involved.
The Stasi was very successful, I believe at one time it had 2 million informants out of a population of just 16 million people, they would have loved the Flock system. Now I could be wrong about the numbers, it's possible that 2 million figure was the total number of informants over their near 41-year period as the Democratic Republic of Germany. And let's be clear, this system isn't just being abused by bad cops, it's also being mistaken abused by good cops who get erroneous information from the actual cameras and technology itself and make arrests and make traffic stops on bad info. The problem with Flock isn't just human, the actual tech is a bit sketchy too.